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Abstract
The Kuwait government is highly depen-
dent on oil revenues; its fiscal position 
is exposed to fluctuations in crude oil 
prices. Reducing expenditures will make 
Kuwait’s government more fiscally robust 
in the context of volatile oil markets. 
Reforming subsides is one way by which 
the government can reduce expendi-
tures. Electricity and water subsidies in 
Kuwait represent about 11–20 percent 
of fiscal expenditures. The goal of this 
paper is to identify behavioural inter-
ventions, ‘nudges’, that could help save 
electricity in the household sector, which 
consumes 50 percent of electricity pro-
duced. We developed the nudges by first, 
reviewing relevant behavioural literature; 
second, conducting focus group inter-
views; third, comparing Kuwait to  other 
Gulf Cooperation Council countries; and 
last, testing the cultural appropriateness 
of the nudges. The first nudge we propose 
is making the government subsidy more 
salient for citizens. The second is acti-
vating social norms. The third is framing, 
adding a message that makes subscribers 
care for future generations. Lastly, there is 
the recognition of saving efforts through a 
reward system.
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Introduction 
The Kuwait government is highly dependent on oil revenues; as a result, its fiscal position 
is exposed to fluctuations in crude oil prices. Reducing expenditures will make Kuwait’s 
government more fiscally robust in the context of volatile oil markets. Reforming subsi-
dies is one way by which the government can reduce expenditures; however, it has proven 
challenging for the government to do so. 
A significant factor delaying ratification of subsidy reform is the widespread public objec-
tion to this initiative. Changing regulations and introducing new reforms will impact 
citizens’ lifestyles and the choices available to them. As a result, one should expect resis-
tance to such changes. 
Electricity and water subsidies in Kuwait are costly; they represent about 11–20 percent 
of fiscal expenditures. The household sector consumes 50 percent of total electricity pro-
duced and was exempt from the change in tariffs introduced in 2016. 
The goal of this paper is to identify behavioural interventions or ‘nudges’ that could help 
save electricity in the household sector. Understanding citizens’ behaviour with respect 
to reforms and communicating effectively around such sensitive topics can help reduce 
conflict and gain the support of citizens. 
We developed the nudges by first, reviewing relevant behavioural literature and interna-
tional nudges; second, conducting focus group interviews; and third, comparing Kuwait to 
other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries in terms of recent reforms and energy 
programmes implemented. Finally, we tested the cultural appropriateness of the nudges 
(instrument evaluation). Understanding citizens’ perspective is an essential input to 
designing communications and nudges. 
The first nudge we propose is making the government subsidy more salient for citizens. 
The second is activating social norms, for example by motivating individuals to save 
energy in an effort to enhance the quality of life in their local community. The third is 
framing, adding a message that makes subscribers care for future generations. Lastly, there 
is the recognition of saving efforts through a reward system. 
Going forward, we intend to test the effectiveness of these four nudges through ran-
domised control trials (RCTs). The results will provide policymakers with evidence as to 
which nudge is most effective in reducing electricity consumption.
Post-Fiscal Deficit Energy Reforms in Kuwait and the GCC
Countries across the GCC provide electricity and water at low rates compared to the 
rest of the world; governments heavily subsidise the price, to the extent that it is fully 
subsidised for Qatari citizens. In other words, Qataris get electricity and water services 
free of charge. After the sharp decline in oil prices in 2014–15, Saudi Arabia implemented 
more reforms than the rest of the GCC countries. Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman have each 
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implemented at least one reform in the electricity and water sector, while the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) only introduced 5 percent VAT in 2018. 
Although electricity and water are subsidised GCC-wide, there exist differences among 
countries in ownership, tariffs and service structures. Electricity tariffs across the GCC are 
set according to consumption-band methodology: the higher the consumption, the higher 
the tariff imposed. Kuwait is the only country in the region where tariffs are fixed regard-
less of consumption. It is also the only country where the government is fully responsible 
for providing electricity and water. In the rest of the GCC, electricity is provided in part-
nership with the private sector. 
Since the decline in oil prices in early 2015 many countries across the region have modi-
fied electricity tariffs.1 Saudi Arabia has increased tariffs twice. On 28 December 2015, the 
country announced reforms for electricity and water tariffs. Out of the eight consumption 
bands, the first two were exempt from the increase in tariffs.  According to the country’s 
Electricity and Cogeneration Regulatory Authority, 87 percent of customers would not 
have been affected by the reform.2
Also in Saudi Arabia, the first pay cheque of a cash transfer programme called the Citizen 
Account Program was issued in November 2017.3  The goal of this programme is to support 
low- and middle-income families. The month after the first pay cheque was issued, a new 
reform to electricity and water tariffs was announced, on 19 December 2017.4  The eight 
residential bands were compressed into two and tariffs were increased in both bands; the 
other sectors’ bands were compressed as well and tariffs increased, except on the com-
mercial sector, where the tariff was slightly reduced. The new prices were applied on 1 
January 2018. The last reform in Saudi Arabia introduced 5 percent VAT on electricity and 
water bills in 2018. 
In February 2016, Bahrain raised electricity and water tariffs on expats and on citizens who 
own more than one residence. Tariffs were also increased in the commercial sector for 
usage of electricity above 5,000 kWh. 
On 12 October 2016, the Omani Authority for Electricity Regulation announced it was 
increasing the tariffs on users who consume more than 150 MW in the commercial, indus-
trial and government sectors; also, peak hour pricing was introduced.5 The tariffs on the 
residential sectors remained unchanged. Users in sectors subject to the change previously 
1  ‘Due to fiscal deficit, Saudi Arabia increases the price of electricity and gasoline’, AlHurra, 28 December 
2015. Available at https://www.alhurra.com/a/ksa-raises-oil-and-energy-prices/290546.html (accessed 1 
October 2018). 
2  ‘New electricity tariffs’, Ajel, December 2015. Available at https://ajel.sa/local/168588 (accessed 1 
October 2018). 
3  ‘Electricity bill will increase 1000 percent on expats in four years’, AlWasat News, 3 January 2016. Avail-
able at http://www.alwasatnews.com/news/1064270.html (accessed 1 October 2018). 
4  ‘Saudi Arabia announces new electricity and energy prices’, Arabian Business, 20 December 2017. Avail-
able at https://arabic.arabianbusiness.com/content/326935 (accessed 1 October 2018).
5  ‘Oman Will Increase Electricity Tariffs Beginning of New Year’, CNBC Arabia, October 2016. Avail-
able at https://www.cnbcarabia.com/news/view/22400/2017/ةيادب-يف-نامُع-ةنطلس-يف-ءابرهكلا-راعسأ-عفر (accessed 1 
October 2018).   
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consumed 30 percent of electricity supply and benefited from 20 percent of government 
subsidies; the new tariffs were expected to save the government OMR 100 million (about 
$260 million). Another increase in electricity tariffs was introduced in 2018.6
Also in 2016 in Oman, the subsidy figure was added to the electricity bill in order to 
increase information sharing. Another initiative was launched in that year: Sahim, a 
renewable energy programme that encourages individuals and institutions to buy and 
install solar panels on their own. The energy company connects the panels to the local 
electricity network, and the government buys any extra electricity produced at the cost of 
production according to certain regulations. A similar initiative was announced in Kuwait 
in October 2018. Oman is also in the process of installing 40,000 smart meters all around 
the country. As of October 2019, 17,000 meters had been installed. 
Electricity and Water in Kuwait 
Brief on Electricity and Water 
In Kuwait, electricity and water supply/distribution is administered by the Ministry of 
Electricity and Water (MEW). Table 1 shows that from 2009 to 2016, the Kuwaiti govern-
ment subsidised close to 95 percent of the cost of electricity and 92 percent of the cost 
of water. The average electricity pre-tax tariff in the member states of the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) was approximately $0.17 in 2014, 
compared with $0.006 in Kuwait, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – 
mainly due to subsidies.7
Table 1: Electricity and Water Subsidies, 2009–16
Year
Electricity (KWD/kWh) Fresh Water (KWD/1,000 gallons)
Cost (KWD) Subsidies (%) Cost (KWD) Subsidies (%)
2009/10 0.0348 94 7.171 89
2010/11 0.0379 95 8.418 90
2011/12 0.0473 96 10.296 92
2012/13 0.0414 95 11.626 92
2013/14 0.0416 95 10.836 93
2014/15 0.0362 94 9.595 92
2015/16 0.0283 93 5.837 86
Source: Ministry of Electricity and Water, Kuwait
6  ‘Electricity tariffs for 2018’, Argaam, 3 February 2018. Available at http://gulf.argaam.com/article/article-
detail/673288 (accessed 1 October 2018).
7  International Monetary Fund (IMF), ‘Kuwait: Selected Issues’, IMF Country Report 15/328, p. 7. Available 
at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2015/cr15328.pdf (accessed 1 October 2017).
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According to the World Bank in 2015, Kuwait was the eighth highest electricity per capita 
consumer in the world.8 This means that electricity users in Kuwait consume nearly five 
times the world average and almost double that of their wealthy OECD counterparts. 
The undersecretary of the MEW, Mohammad Bushehri, noted that air conditioners (AC) 
drain a significant amount of energy, and if AC users were to increase thermostat tem-
peratures from 21 or 22°C to 26 or 28°C, approximately 20 percent of the cost of fuel used 
to generate electricity would be conserved. The undersecretary also noted that in 2017 
Kuwait was set to burn 350,000 barrels of oil a day to produce energy and water, and by 
2035 Kuwait would have to burn one million barrels a day to meet demand.9
Table 2: Electricity and Water Subsidy Bill, 2006–16
Fiscal Year
Electricity and Water  
Subsidy (KWD)
Total Fiscal Expenditure 
(KWD)
Share of Total Fiscal 
Expenditure (%)
2006/7 1,235,239,422 10,306,377,533 12
2007/8 1,801,963,822 9,698,018,470 19
2008/9 3,127,033,468 18,262,198,464 17
2009/10 2,241,626,761 11,250,709,963 20
2010/11 3,203,044,635 16,221,001,904 20
2011/12 2,939,632,897 17,007,429,079 17
2012/13 3,628,466,877 19,307,556,125 19
2013/14 3,060,877,450 18,903,305,806 16
2014/15 2,729,991,951 21,415,459, 256 13
2015/16 1,983,036,951 18,245,866,123 11
Source: Ministry of Electricity and Water, Kuwait10
Energy Subsidy Cost
Annually, Kuwait’s government subsidises most of the electricity and water outgoings 
in the country. It is worth noting that the MEW buys fuel from the Kuwait Petroleum 
Company at global market prices, making fuel the most expensive component of the 
subsidy cost (close to 75 percent). Table 2 shows that over the period 2006–16 the elec-
tricity and water subsidy bill comprised roughly 11–20 percent of total fiscal expenditures. 
8  World Bank, ‘World Development Report 2015: Mind, Society, and Behavior’. Available at http://www.
worldbank.org/en/publication/wdr2015 (accessed 18 October 2019). 
9  ‘Bushehri: Direct debit payment to pay electricity bill in instalments’, Alanbaa, 11 July 2017. Available at 
http://www.alanba.com.kw/ar/kuwait-news/759563/11-07-2017 (accessed 1 October 2017).
10  1 Kuwaiti dinar (KWD) = $3.2. MEW subsidy total = second + fourth chapter total expenditures.
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The IMF estimates that energy subsidies were somewhere between 5 percent and 6.5 
percent of GDP over the period 2012–15.11 
Pecuniary and Non-Pecuniary Approaches to Saving Energy in Kuwait 
To save energy, governments worldwide employ pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
approaches to influence consumer behaviour. Pecuniary approaches involve price or tax 
increases. Non-pecuniary approaches involve communications campaigns intended to 
spread awareness.
Over the years, the MEW has launched several campaigns to promote water and energy 
conservation in Kuwait. The Tarsheed campaign, launched in 2015 to spread awareness 
of the importance of smart use of energy, encouraged individuals to use LED lighting to 
save electricity and smart equipment to control water flow, and also urged households to 
educate domestic workers on the importance of not wasting water washing cars. 
The Kuwait government did not consider pecuniary approaches to alter demand between 
1966 and 2016. The decision to adjust prices was mainly motivated by Kuwait’s fiscal posi-
tion. The low energy prices in the country could explain the high tendency to consume, 
which puts more pressure on the fiscal accounts. Fattouh and Mahadeva show theoret-
ically that a move towards market pricing in Kuwait would complement investment in 
infrastructure and remove the distortions in the power sector. These authors suggest 
picking a market price that makes consumers more efficient in their use of energy.12
The IMF suggests that over the longer term, price reform for energy products should 
aim to fully liberalise pricing. The IMF also notes that the appropriate change in prices 
across energy products depends on a number of factors, including the magnitude of the 
price increase to bring domestic prices to the relevant global benchmark, the fiscal posi-
tion, the political and social context in which the reform is taking place, and the time 
needed to develop an effective communications strategy and social safety nets. A phased 
approach to reform provides time for households and firms to adjust and helps reduce 
the impact of the reform on inflation, whereas a large, abrupt increase in energy prices can 
generate intense opposition to reform. The IMF also notes that in the long term, energy 
price reforms affect growth positively, given the associated increase in the efficiency of 
the economy, the boost in public investment, and the enhancement of incentives for 
greater private investment. In the short term, however, energy price reforms will increase 
prices for consumers and the cost of inputs for firms; this will lower both real income for 
households and profits for firms, thus impacting economic activity. Therefore a gradual 
adjustment in energy prices would be preferable, to help keep inflation under control and 
to provide time for the productive sector to adjust to the new prices in the economy.13
11  IMF, ‘Kuwait: Selected Issues’.
12  Bassam Fattouh and Lavan Mahadeva, ‘Price Reform in Kuwait’s Electricity and Water Sector: Assess-
ing the Net Benefits in the Process of Congestion’, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies Paper MEP 9, April 
2014.
13  IMF, ‘Kuwait: Selected Issues’.
10 Utilising Applied Behavioural Research to Execute Subsidy Reform in Kuwait
In March 2017, the MEW announced it was increasing electricity and water prices to alter 
consumption and boost revenues. The Minister of Electricity and Water, Essam Al-Mar-
zouq, announced the new tariffs (Table 3) and claimed that the new electricity and water 
prices would boost annual collection from KWD 180–200 million to KWD 350–400 
million and decrease consumption by 10 percent.14
From Table 3 we can see that the residential sector was exempt from the adjustment in 
tariffs even though it represented 50 percent of total energy consumption (Table 4). The 
highest increase in tariffs was applied to the government sector (1,150 percent). More 
adjustments in tariffs are expected to take place after the government installs smart 
meters. Furthermore, major adjustments will indeed occur if the national assembly 
approves plans to privatise electricity and water. 
Table 3: Electricity and Water Tariffs, 2017–2018
Sector Electricity  
(fils/kWh)15
Fresh Water 
(KWD/1,000 gallons)
New Tariff 
Start Date
Old New Increase (%) Old New Increase (%)
Residential 2 2 0 0.8 0.8 0 -
Investment 
(Residential)16 
2 5 150 0.8 2 150 22/08/17
Commercial 2 5 150 0.8 2 150 22/05/17
Government 2 25 1,150 0.8 4 400 22/11/17
Agricultural/ 
Industrial
2 5 150 0,8 1.25 56 22/02/18
Agricultural/
Industrial 
(Producers)
1 3 200 0.25 0.75 200 22/02/18
Others (Chalets, 
Ranches, Stables)
10 12 20 0.8 2 150 22/02/18
Source: Ministry of Electricity and Water, Kuwait
14  ‘AlMarzouq: New tariff will start as scheduled’, AlAnbaa, 3 March 2017. Available at http://www.alanba.
com.kw/ar/kuwait-news/726620/03-03-2017 (accessed 1 October 2017).  
15  1,000 fils = KWD 1.
16  Kuwaiti nationals living in a residential buy/let unit and who do not own other properties will be 
charged a tariff equivalent to that for Kuwaitis living in villas/houses in the residential sector; i.e. they 
will be exempt from the new tariff applicable to the investment (residential) sector.
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Table 4: Electricity Consumption by Sector (in percent), 2012–2017
Sector 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Residential & Investment 50 50 50 50 51 52
Inside Plant  12 12 12 12 12 11
Commercial 7 7 7 7 7 7
Government 8 8 8 8 8 8
Industrial 13 13 13 13 13 13
Energy Loss 10 10 10 10 10 10
Source: Ministry of Electricity and Water, Kuwait
Will the new tariffs succeed in altering consumption? For a price strategy to be effective 
in managing high energy demand, a significant price increase would need to be created, 
given that the price elasticity of demand is very low or inelastic.
Fattouh and Mahadeva assume a water and electricity long-run elasticity of demand of 
−0.5 in Kuwait and accordingly predict that a rise in market prices to ten to eleven times 
the 2016 level would lower demand by one third, assuming that the base or subsistence 
level of demand (which is completely inelastic; above it all other demand is elastic) is 
zero.17  These authors argue that if this level of subsistence demand is proven to be higher 
than zero – in other words, demand is more inelastic than they assume – then the changes 
in prices they propose would alter demand by less than expected. Note that the residential 
price of electricity had not changed in Kuwait since the 1960s. 
The recent adjustment in water and electricity tariffs would be a good opportunity for the 
government to assess how responsive demand is to changes in price in all sectors. The 
exception is the residential sector, which the government exempted from the increase in 
tariffs, as we have seen.
This uncertainty in predicting how pecuniary approaches will curb demand calls for con-
sidering different types of non-pecuniary approaches to encourage conservation behaviour 
– and specifically for behavioural interventions or ‘nudges’. Behavioural interventions tar-
geted at accelerating revenue by improving late payment and bad debt collection have 
proved to be successful in different countries; Kuwait has similar challenges and could 
find some of the nudges discussed in the next section inspiring.
17  Fattouh and Mahadeva, ‘Price Reform in Kuwait’s Electricity and Water Sector’.
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Introducing Behavioural Science 
Before we move on to reviewing literature on relevant behavioural tools and their appli-
cations worldwide, it is essential to highlight the main energy consumption challenges 
putting pressure on Kuwait’s government fiscal accounts. These challenges include: 
1. High consumption rates. High consumption could be explained by low energy prices 
relative to personal income, lack of awareness/marketing of clean-power options, lack 
of information on real-time consumption or infrequent feedback on consumption. 
With conventional energy meters, consumption information is conveyed to consum-
ers with a delay rather than in real time. Infrequent and limited feedback provisions 
prevent users from being aware of the amount of energy required to power a given 
appliance. 
2. Late payments. 
3. Overdue debts (Table 5).
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Table 5: Overdue Payment Balance (KWD) by Type as of 30 April 2017
Residential Investment 
(Residential)/
Chalets
Public Industrial Agricultural Commercial Services/
Embassies
Total
Late Payment18 113,557,532.63 19,717.009.87 23,608,642.01 11,598,021.98 4,152,808.34 6,222,289.80 368,093.23 179,224,397.85
Instalment19 20,996,040.64 - - - - - - 20,996,040.64
Unsettled20 6,441,876,65 12,634,769.30 - 131,764.94 37,638.16 2,029,063.72 39,719.32 21,314,832.09
Legal Claims21 8,497,275.69 406,819.84 - 246,039.93 92,186.54 98,560.38 806.75 9,341,689.12
Total Balance 
Due
149,492,725.61 32,758,599.00 23,608,642.01 11,975,826.84 4,282,633.05 8,349,913.90 408,619.30 230,876,959.70
Source: Ministry of Electricity and Water, Kuwait 
18  Overdue payments that were not settled, rescheduled in the form of instalments or legally pursued.
19  Overdue payments that were rescheduled in the form of instalments by a bank.
20  Overdue payments from consumers who cannot be reached.
21  Overdue payments pursued by legal action.
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Review of Relevant Behavioural Tools
In this section we outline twelve relevant behavioural tools that have been discussed in 
the literature along with their impact. We then discuss the focus group interview results 
and end with four nudges suitable for Kuwait. 
Loss aversion: Knetsch provides evidence that people commonly demand more to give 
up an entitlement than they would pay to acquire the same good, or people tend to prefer 
avoiding losses much more than they would prefer new gains.22 Bager and Mundaca 
showed that loss-framed, salient information coupled with smart meters reduced demand 
for energy in Denmark by 7–11 percent compared to unframed information.23
Status quo bias: Individuals make most judgements and choices automatically, not delib-
eratively. Therefore small changes to the choice architecture in which decisions are made 
can have strong effects on behaviour.24  Samuelson and Zeckhauser provide evidence that 
shows individuals have a tendency to select the status quo alternative; that is, do nothing 
or maintain the default option when presented with other alternatives.25
Feedback: Providing feedback is an important tool to reduce energy consumption, as it 
makes users aware of their consumption and it allows them to learn and form habits. 
An early study by Seligman, Darley and Campbell provided subjects with feedback on 
their use of AC systems. After one month, the subjects reduced their consumption by 10.5 
percent compared to the control group.26
The British Office of Gas and Electricity Markets conducted a study regarding how 
behavioural interventions can encourage energy conversation. The results showed that the 
deployment of smart meters coupled with the installation of real-time information displays 
resulted in energy savings of 2–4 percent more than in the absence of real-time display.27
Goal setting: Goals influence the direct performance and achievements of individuals if 
the goals are set at the right level of difficulty. Becker tested the effects of combined goal 
setting and feedback on conservation behaviour. An easy goal was to save 2 percent of 
energy while a difficult goal required saving 20 percent of energy. The study revealed that 
22  Jack Knetsch, ‘Preferences and Nonreversibility of Indifference Curves’, Journal of Economic Behaviour 
and Organization 17/1 (1992), pp. 131–9.
23  Simon Bager and Luis Mundaca, ‘Making “smart meters” smarter? Insights from a behavioural eco-
nomics pilot field experiment in Copenhagen, Denmark’, Energy Research & Social Science 28 (2017), pp. 
68–76.
24  World Bank, ‘World Development Report 2015’.
25  William Samuelson and Richard Zeckhauser, ‘Status quo bias in decision making’, Journal of Risk and 
Uncertainty 1/1 (1988), pp. 7–59.
26  Clive Seligman and John Darley, ‘Feedback as a means of decreasing residential energy consumption’, 
Journal of Applied Psychology 62/4 (1977), pp. 363–8.
27  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), ‘Behavioural Insights for Envi-
ronmentally Relevant Policies: Review of Experiences from OECD Countries and Beyond’ (Paris: OECD, 
2016).
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the difficult-goal group was the only one which used significantly less electricity.28
Karlan et al. show that the combination of goal setting and monthly reminders sent by 
three different banks in Bolivia, Peru and the Philippines helped clients meet their savings 
goals. The researchers’ results suggest that the most effective reminders are those that 
remind people of both financial incentives and savings goals.29
Timing: The timing of communication could have substantial effect on recipients. The 
Behavioural Insights Team (BIT) in the UK collaborated with the Courts Service to find 
whether well-timed text messages might increase fine payment rates. The team found that 
sending individuals text messages reminding them to pay their court fines 10 days before 
bailiffs were due to arrive increased payment rates by two to three times, and personalis-
ing the message increased the amount even more.30
Personalisation: When a message deals with possible negative consequences, personali-
sation may make those consequences seem more likely by conveying that the sender has 
accurate and detailed records and will act on them. The BIT collaborated with the Driving 
and Vehicle Licensing Agency (DVLA) to test whether different messages could improve 
the response rates of individuals who failed to tax their vehicles. The trial involved testing 
the original DVLA letter against one that included an image of the drivers’ own vehicles. 
The results show that the image letter increased relicensing rates by 9 percent compared 
to the original letter.31
Salience and framing: The way in which facts are presented has a great influence on 
whether they are absorbed and how judgements are reached.32 Bordalo, Gennaioli and 
Shleifer mark an attribute as salient if it stands out among a given good’s/product’s attri-
butes relative to that attribute’s average level in the choice set. The authors propose a 
theory in which consumers attach disproportionately high weight to salient attributes, 
and hence end up leaning towards goods with higher quality/price ratios.33
The BIT collaborated with New South Wales’ Department of Premier and Cabinet and its 
Office of State Revenue to improve payment levels from individuals who failed to respond 
to penalty reminder notices. The intervention involved printing a red ‘Pay Now’ stamp in 
a prominent position on letters received by the treatment group, alongside a number of 
other changes to make the messaging more salient. The results show that there was a 3.1 
percent increase in the payment rate. 
28  Lawrence Becker, ‘Joint effect of feedback and goal-setting on performance: A field study of residential 
energy conservation’, Journal of Applied Psychology 63 (1978), pp. 428–33. 
29  Dean Karlan, Margaret McConnell, Sendhil Mullainathan and Jonathan Zinman, ‘Getting to the top of 
mind: How reminders increase saving’, Management Science 62/12 (2016), pp. 3393–411.
30  Behavioural Insights Team (BIT), ‘EAST: Four Simple Ways to Apply Behavioural Insights’ (2014). 
Available at http://www.behaviouralinsights.co.uk/publications/east-four-simple-ways-to-apply-be-
havioural-insights (accessed 1 October 2017).
31  Ibid.
32  World Bank, ‘World Development Report 2015’.
33  Pedro Bordalo, Nicola Gennaioli and Andrei Shleifer, ‘Salience and consumer choice’, Journal of Polit-
ical Economy 121/5 (2013), pp. 803–43.
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Satisficing: Various simplification strategies may help reduce cognitive overload and facil-
itate more effective decision-making with regard to energy consumption. These might 
include making a desired action easier, quicker and more convenient (e.g., automating 
relevant technology). Unnecessary complexity and sensory overload should be avoided 
by framing messages in a clear, concise and comprehensible format. 
Shared group identity: Creating a shared group identity where people can feel their indi-
vidual contribution is important, and emphasising that many other consumers are also 
actively saving energy (i.e., capitalising on descriptive social norms), may help reduce 
free-riding and social loafing in group settings. Making any shared outcomes or collective 
achievements more salient, and publicly acknowledging the efforts of individuals, may 
also help motivate people to contribute to the greater good. Experimental work suggests 
too that embedding social dilemmas and intragroup conflict in intergroup competition 
may reduce free-riding,34 and that inducing a sense of social inclusion may increase pro-so-
cial behaviour by fostering empathetic concern for others.35
Perceived trust: Since trust serves as a decision-making tool for reducing cognitive com-
plexity and may influence how people respond to various risks, information and incentives 
are likely to be more motivating – and therefore have greater behavioural impact – if they 
stem from credible, trustworthy sources. In support of this notion, Craig and McCann 
found that messages identified as originating from a high-credibility source were asso-
ciated with significantly more customer requests for energy conservation information, 
as well as greater actual electricity savings, than the same messages originating from a 
low-credibility source (e.g., a local electrical utility).36
Intrinsic and extrinsic rewards: Non-pecuniary rewards such as praise, recognition and 
social approval should be capitalised on to incentivise energy conservation. While finan-
cial incentives are often used in efforts to promote pro-environmental behaviour, research 
suggests that such approaches may compare unfavourably to non-monetary interventions 
in terms of producing durable behaviour change over the longer term.37
Social identity effect – an appeal to local identity and its collective good: If individual 
incentives are not enough to change behaviour, other sources of motivation are needed. 
Tajfel and Turner proposed that the groups (e.g., social class, family, football team etc.) 
to which people belong are an important source of pride and self-esteem.38 Rather than 
saving being framed as an individual issue, it could be framed as a collective effort. This is 
34  Anne Gunnthorsdottir and Amnon Rapoport, ‘Embedding social dilemmas in intergroup competition 
reduces free-riding’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 101/2 (2006), pp. 184–99. 
35  Jean Twenge, Roy Baumeister, C. Nathan DeWall, Natalie Ciarocco, J. Michael Bartels, ‘Social exclu-
sion decreases prosocial behavior’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 92/1 (2007), pp. 56–66.
36  C. Samuel Craig and John McCann, ‘Assessing communication effects on energy conservation’, Journal 
of Consumer Research 5/2 (1978), pp. 82–8.
37  P. Wesley Schultz, ‘Strategies for promoting proenvironmental behavior: Lots of tools but few instruc-
tions’, European Psychologist 19 (2014), pp. 107–17. 
38  Henri Tajfel and John Turner, ‘The social identity theory of intergroup behaviour’, in William G Austin 
and Stephen Worchel (eds.), Psychology of Intergroup Relations (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1986), pp. 7–24.
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achieved by allocating a percentage of savings achieved by each family to a trusted organ-
isation in the local community. 
Focus Group Interview Results 
Our research project aims at identifying promising nudges that could enhance savings 
in electricity and water consumption in Kuwait. The investigation of potential nudges 
started with qualitative interviews focusing on the knowledge of and attitudes towards 
domestic water and electricity use of householders (see the Appendix). Identifying the 
obstacles that inhibit citizens, parliament and the Kuwaiti government from efficiently 
saving energy will help in choosing the appropriate type of behavioural interventions. 
The focus group interviews revealed the following barriers to electricity and water reforms 
in Kuwait:
1. Lack of information regarding the electricity and water subsidy cost. It was clear 
that most participants were unaware of the true total cost of electricity per kWh and 
the proportion subsidised by the government (80–90 percent). Most participants were 
also unaware of the total cost of the electricity and water subsidy, as this figure is not 
reflected in the fiscal account; rather it is distributed over several budget ‘chapters’. 
2. Weak communication channels between the MEW and energy users. Users do 
not receive periodic notifications or bills from the MEW with respect to their con-
sumption. The MEW obtains electricity and water readings directly from users and no 
guidelines are set with respect to how frequently users should submit readings.
3. Electricity and water meters do not reflect consumption in real time. Users are 
therefore unable to monitor and track their usage effectively. 
4. Lack of benchmarks to which citizens can compare their consumption. 
5. Lack of confidence in the government’s ability to efficiently use savings from elec-
tricity and water. 
6. Concerns regarding inflation. 
7. Hopes that the government will write off citizens’ bad debts as it did in 2005. 
8. Views that the government does not convey seriousness with respect to saving 
energy. 
9. Views that the government is not aggressive enough with respect to implementing 
certain measure. For example, it often announces a certain change, then defers for 
further study. Participants are conscious that something needs to be done. 
The barriers listed above could also provide insight into the opportunities the government 
has to reform consumers’ behaviour. Overall, one might conclude that people would not 
be surprised to see new policies around utility provisions and would not actively object. 
One consideration to keep in mind is the challenge of persuading wealthy families, who 
are in all probability a group for whom conspicuous consumption is a way of life, that 
what amount to small savings are worthwhile. A further consideration is the technical 
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infrastructure. Metering and smart metering of electricity and water use, and an effec-
tive charging regime, are a vital component in influencing domestic usage and behaviour. 
With metering comes the possibility of feedback on household consumption and efficient 
charging regimes including, for example, spot pricing to reduce peak loads. 
Potential Nudges 
In light of both the scientific literature and the acquired contextual knowledge, we have 
identified four interventions as ‘nudges’ that can be either implemented singly or com-
bined for tackling the issue of reducing electricity consumption. The effectiveness of these 
nudges can only be ascertained by carrying out a field experiment.
The team visited Kuwait with two objectives: (1) to find out about domestic energy use, 
tariff structures, payment methods and the introduction of smart meters, and (2) to learn 
about cultural values, norms and behavioural routines that might have a bearing on the 
impact of different nudges. This latter objective was deemed important as much of the 
nudge literature comes from the US and Western Europe or from countries such as New 
Zealand that are ‘Western’ in orientation. It is an open question whether successful nudges 
from these Western countries would translate to Kuwait. Our conversations with Kuwaiti 
informants suggested that some nudges would simply not work. For example, consider 
this nudge from the UK: when billing households, they are told that their electricity con-
sumption is X percent above the average for dwellings of the same size on the street. The 
consensus opinion of our Kuwaiti informants was that this would have no impact what-
soever. Also, most subscribers do not pay their bills on time, and hence percentages will 
not reflect real consumption. In addition, participants mostly thought that addressing the 
environmental impact of consumption would not influence how they behave. 
The four nudges selected for the behavioural study were deemed by our informants to be 
the most likely to have an impact. Also, we are limited to four nudges in order to have suf-
ficient sample sizes to be confident of any observed impact, as our overall sample size is 
1,200 participating households (only 1,200 houses were set to have smart meters by April 
2019), segmented as villas and semi-detached properties.
We have selected four nudges that are scalable and relatively easy to implement in a short 
period of time. Some of them are designed in terms of restructuring or adding new infor-
mation to the existing bill. Previous implementation has demonstrated that even small 
changes in documents such as bills can produce substantial change in behaviour in the 
target population. The proposed interventions are:
1. Salience of subsidy. This consists of restructuring information in the electricity bill 
in graphical form (Figure 1). The rationale for this intervention is that the exploratory 
research conducted has shown there are people not aware of the level of subsidy. This 
intervention is essentially based on the psychological effect of framing. The subsidy 
cost is included when billing subscribers in other countries in the GCC, specifically in 
Oman, Bahrain and Abu Dhabi.39
39  Electricity and Water Authority, Kingdom of Bahrain, ‘Understand your bill’. Available at http://www.
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Figure 1: Subsidies by Government
2. Activating social norms. The rationale behind this nudge is that individuals with high 
incomes may find monetary saving from reducing energy not worth the effort, and 
therefore may be less motivated to alter their consumption. Instead, those individ-
uals may find reducing consumption worthwhile if savings go to a good cause. For 
instance, total energy savings from all households could be allocated to improving 
the facilities or services in the local community, such as the Co-op society, schools, 
or other public institutions which are widely supported by the local community (as 
we have been told by the focus group participants). In this way, we could use people’s 
social identity as a motivator in contributing to a better community where they live, 
and at the same time the social pressure from the community will act as a deterrent 
to free-riding behaviour.
3. Framing in the context of health or children. The third nudge consists of adding a 
highly visible message to the energy bill, linking energy consumption to health or fu-
ture generations’ wealth or quality of life. The rationale is to reduce the psychological 
distance between citizens and the notion of being healthy or economically sustain-
able, by reminding them to care for future generations.
4. Symbolic and social rewards. This nudge sets an award system for citizens who suc-
ceed in altering their consumption and meeting their targets. The reward does not 
have to be financial; it can rather be symbolic and social. The reward system is based 
on uses and gratifications theory (UGT), which was initially developed by Maslow.40 
Many contemporary mobile apps apply the gratification theory to get people ‘hooked’. 
They all exploit the psychological gratification that we receive from being told that 
we have achieved something (even though such achievement is fictional or of little im-
ewa.bh/en/Customer/BillsTariffs/understand-your-bill (accessed 8 April 2019); Abu Dhabi Distribution 
Co., ‘Understand your bill’. Available at https://www.addc.ae/en-US/business/Pages/UnderstandYour-
Bill.aspx (accessed 8 April 2019).
40  Abraham Maslow, ‘A theory of human motivation’, Psychological Review 50/4 (1943), pp. 370–96.
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portance). The use of ‘achievements’ can be shared via social media and could act as a 
motivator for sustainable performance or a basis for comparison with peers. 
Note that the above nudges can be used in combination. For instance, the ‘awards and 
gratification’ approach would work well with the social identity effect: ‘I am proud that 
my neighbourhood has been awarded the badge of honour for prudent electricity usage.’
However, during the pilot and testing stage it is better to deploy each nudge separately to 
understand its unique effectiveness. In the next subsection, we will briefly outline a pre-
liminary proposal for how we could test the nudges. 
Testing the Effectiveness of Proposed Nudges 
The best way to test these interventions is through field experiment. In order to test these 
interventions, a sample of households with smart meters should be compiled. The size of 
this sample may vary; the consequence of such variation is less or more reliability in the 
statistical analysis that will evaluate the effectiveness of each behavioural intervention. 
The rationale for the design is based on the logic of a randomised controlled trial, in which 
one or more intervention or treatment groups are ‘treated’ with one of the four nudges 
selected, and a control group, which does not receive a nudge, is present. A comparison of 
the performances of the control group and the treatment group will allow us to ascertain 
whether the interventions were effective. We estimate that an observation period should 
be a minimum of three months and ideally six months. 
Conclusion
Reforming subsidies is one way by which the Kuwait government can reduce expenditures 
and become more robust in the face of fluctuations in oil prices. Electricity and water 
represent a significant portion of the government’s fiscal expenditures. Overconsumption 
of energy by households is putting pressure on the budget. Behavioural science could be 
used to direct better use of electricity and water.
The goal of this paper is to identify behavioural interventions, ‘nudges’, that could help 
save electricity in the household sector. We have noted nine barriers to energy reform. We 
highlight four here: 
1. Lack of information regarding the electricity and water subsidy cost. 
2. Weak communication channels between the MEW and energy users.
3. Inability to monitor real-time consumption. 
4. Lack of confidence in the government’s ability to efficiently use savings from electric-
ity and water.
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We then proposed four potential nudges that could prove to be effective in curbing exces-
sive consumption. The first nudge we proposed is making the government subsidy more 
salient for citizens by adding it to the energy bill. The second nudge is activating social 
norms, for example motivating individuals to save energy to enhance the quality of life in 
their local community. Third is framing, adding a message that makes subscribers care for 
future generations. Last is recognition of saving efforts through a reward system. 
We intend to test the effectiveness of the four nudges through RCTs. The results will 
provide policymakers with evidence as to which nudge is most effective in reducing elec-
tricity consumption. After all, before making costly commitments to new policies it is 
rational to find out whether the new policies are likely to deliver benefits.
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Appendix: Focus Groups Interview Details 
Sector Nb of participants and gender Education Age Location 
1 5 males and 1 female 5 Bachelor’s degrees, 
1 Master’s degree 
21–29 Private 
Diwaniya
2 6 males 6 PhD holders 30–38 Kuwait 
University 
3 5 males and 6 females 2 university students, 
6 Bachelor’s degrees, 
2 Master’s degrees, 1 
PhD holder
19–45 Kuwait 
University 
4 1 male member of parliament Bachelor’s degree 30 National 
Assembly 
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